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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

RALPH J. HENDERSON, an individual,
Supreme Court
Docket No. 35138

Appellant,
VS.

HENDERSON INVESTMENT
PROPERTIES, L.L.C., an Idaho Limited
Liability Company, ROGER E. HENDERSON,
an individual, and LISA A. HENDERSON, an
individual,
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court
Bannock County, Idaho
Honorable Ronald E. Bush, District Judge

Norman G. Reece, Jr.
NORMAN G. REECE, P.C.
445 W. Chubbuck Rd., Ste. D
Chubbuck, ID 83202

Ron Kerl, Esq.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHTD.
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondents
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents adopt the factual representations contained in Appellant's recitations set out at
page 1 of the Appellant's Brief, however, contrary to the argument ofAppellant, Respondents do not
believe that the District Court erred in awarding them their attorney fees under the provisions of the
Operating Agreement of Henderson Investment Properties, LLC ("HIP").

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Respondents adopt the representations contained in Appellant's recitations set out at pages
2-3 of the Appellant's Brief.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents adoptthe factual representations contained in Appellant's recitations as set out
at pages 3-6 of the Appellant's Brief.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding the Respondents their attorney fees under
the provisions of the Operating Agreement of Henderson Investment Properties, LLC?
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Findings of fact made by the trial court, which are necessaiy in the exercise of its discretion,
are not to be set aside by this Court absent a showing that the facts found by the trial court were not
support by substantial and competent evidence. "A trial court's findings of fact will be set aside only
if clearly erroneous, which means that they were not supported by substantial, competent evidence.
(citation omitted)." Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 185 P.3d 253,255 (Idaho 2008).

B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN AWARDING RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEY FEES
1. DISSOLUTION COMPLAINT
The trial court determined that the Respondents were entitled to their attorney fees under the
terms of the HIP Operating Agreement. Article XIV(G) of the Operating Agreement provides:

In any action or proceeding brought to enforce any provision of this agreement, or
where any provision is asserted as a defense, the successful party is entitled to
recover reasonable attorney's fees in addition to any other remedy. R.p.114.
Appellants do not contend that (1) Respondents were not the prevailing parties in the litigation
below, or (2) the trial court did not consider the applicable factors set forth in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) or
any other appropriate factor. Lee v. Nickerson, supra at 189 P.3d 467, 472-473 (Idaho 2008). Nor
has Appellant claimed that the amount of the attorney fees awarded was unreasonable.
Instead, Appellant claims that the trial court did not exercise reason in deciding to award the
Respondents their attorney fees. See, Appellant's Brief, p. 9, wherein it is argued:
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statutory provision intended to specifically bring an end to an entity that would not
exist but for the contract between the parties. Rather, Ralph sought to enforce a
variety of Operating Agreement provisions, for the purpose of obtaining dissolution
of the business entity, and he was unsuccessful in that pursuit." R. pp. 177-178.
One specific term of the IDP Operating Agreement was heavily relied upon by Appellant. That term
is contained in Article XIV(B). That paragraph reads:

B. Specific Performance. The parties to this Agreement agree that irreparable
damage would occur if any of the provisions of this Agreement were not performed
in accordance with its specific terms or were otherwise breached. The parties agree
that they are entitled to injunction or injunctions to prevent breaches of this
Agreement and to specifically enforce the terms and provisions in any United States
comi or any state having jurisdiction, in addition to any other remedy to which they
are entitled at law or in equity.

In order to succeed in his request for judicial dissolution under either Idaho Code §53-643(1 )(a) or
§53-643(l)(b), Appellant had to prove - in addition to other things - that irreparable injury to filP
was being suffered or was being threatened.
The trial court found that IDP had not been threatened by or suffered any irreparable injury.
R. pp 141, 150-151. A review of the record shows that Appellant did not introduce evidence of
irreparable injury- real or tl1reatened. Rather, Appellant solely relied upon Article XIV(B) offue
Operating Agreement. Appellant argued that ifhe proved violations of the Operating Agreement
on fue part of the Respondents, those violations, when applied with the provisions of Article XIV(B)
supplied the needed element of irreparable injury and would force a judicial dissolution of HIP.
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Article XIV(G) of the Operating Agreement provides that "In any action or proceeding
brought to enforce any provision of this agreement, or where any provision is asserted as a defense,
the successful party is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees in addition to any other remedy.
R.p.114." Since Appellant tried to enforce many different provisions of the Operating Agreement and failed - Respondents are entitled to their attorney fees and costs pursuant to the parties contract.

2. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT COMPLAINT
In urging this Court to disallow the trial court's attorney fee award, Appellant argues that the
relief sought in the Appellant's Declaratory Judgment action was also unrelated, in its entirety, to
the HIP Operating Agreement. Appellant's Declaratory Judgment Complaint is set out in the record
at R. pp 48-70. This action was dismissed, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
The Appellant has made no claim that (1) Respondents were not the prevailing parties in the
litigation below, or (2) the trial court did not consider the applicable factors set forth in I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) or any other appropriate factor in awarding Respondents their attorney fees.

Lee v.

Nickerson, supra at 189 P.3d 467, 472-473 (Idaho 2008). Nor has Appellant claimed that the
amount of fees awarded by the trial court were unreasonable.
The general thesis of Appellant's Declaratory Judgment Complaint was that since he had
brought the Dissolution Complaint against Roger and Lisa on July 27, 2005, and the dissolution
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existence of the dissolution complaint (and the allegations contained therein) the Appellant could
not invoke Idaho Code §53-641(1)(e) to disassociate the Respondents.
The trial court found Appellant's theory in the Declaratory Judgment Action to be specious
and declined to use Idaho Code §53-64l(l)(e) in the manner sought by Appellant.

It would allow a means of accomplishing the same without truly offering an
opportunity for full and fair consideration of the basis for such disassociation. It
would allow an opportunity for someone who might have a personal vendetta or be
otherwise disgruntled against other members of the Limited Liability Company Act
(sic) to lay in wait and utilize such a provision in a manner that the Court would find
to be inconsistent with an interpretation of Idaho law that is intended to achieve
justice.
Now, I would define justice in the setting to be consistent with due process, which
is to have fair opportunity to respond and defend and have matters decided on the
merits.
So for those reasons, Counsel, the Court will grant defendants' Rule l 2(b)(6) motion
to dismiss the complaint. ...
The trial court found that the legal issues in the Declaratory Judgment Complaint were
essentially the same as those brought in the Declaratory Judgment Complaint, and for the same
reasons given in the first instance, fees were awarded to the Respondents for their successful defense
of the second lawsuit. R. p.184. That finding of fact is not clearly erroneous and should not be set
aside by this Court. Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 185 P.3d 253, 255 (Idaho 2008).
The trial court did not ignore the context in which the declaratory judgment complaint was
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1338 (1994). Rohr v. Rohr, 128 Idaho 137, 143 (Idaho 1996). The Operating Agreement provides
the 'contractual right' necessary to award Respondents their attorney fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The Appellant has not established that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous
nor has he established that the trial court's award of attorney fees to the Respondents was an abuse
of its discretion. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

T

Respectfully submitted this

/tJ day of December, 2008.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY on the

~

/,t} day of December, 2008, I served two (2) trne and correct

copies of the foregoing document as follows:
Norman G. Reece, Jr.
NORMAN G. REECE, P.C.
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